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ABSTRACT
Being able to exactly detect large network flows under an arbitrary time win-
dow model is expected in many current and future applications like Denial-
of-Service (DoS) flow detection, bandwidth guarantee, etc. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no existing work that can achieve exact large
flow detection without per-flow status. Maintaining per-flow status requires
a large amount of expensive line-speed storage, thus it is not practical in
real systems. Therefore, we proposed a novel model of an arbitrary time
window with exactness outside an ambiguity region, which trades the level
of exactness for scalability. Although some existing work also uses some
techniques like sampling, multistage filters, etc. to make the system scal-
able, most of them do not support the arbitrary time window model and
they usually introduce a lot of false positives for legitimate flows. Inspired
by a frequent item finding algorithm, we proposed Exact-outside-Ambiguity-
Region Detector (EARDet), an arbitrary-window-based, eﬃcient, simple,
and no-per-flow-status large flow detector, which is exact outside an ambi-
guity window defined by a high-bandwidth threshold and a low-bandwidth
threshold. EARDet is able to catch all large flows violating the high-
bandwidth threshold; meanwhile it protects all legitimate flows complying
with the low-bandwidth threshold. Because EARDet focuses on flow clas-
sification but not flow size estimation, it demonstrates amazing scalability
such that we can fit the storage into on-chip Static Random-Access Memory
(SRAM) to achieve line-speed detection. To evaluate EARDet, we not only
theoretically proved properties of EARDet above, but also evaluated them
with real traﬃc, and the result perfectly supports our analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Accurately identifying large flows1 which occupy high bandwidth or con-
sume a large volume of link bandwidth over some short time window is signif-
icantly important for various applications in networking and security, such as
Denial of Service (DoS) defense and bandwidth guarantee. However, no ex-
isting scalable approach both considers large flows over the arbitrary window
model and is exact in classifying flows in one pass. The arbitrary window
model considers large flows over every range of time which begins at each
time point in the past and ends at the current time, so that it can even de-
tect burst flows which could evade the detection by a system over fixed-time
window model.
Hence, we proposed a newly designed model with exactness outside a small
ambiguity region, which is determined by two adjustable bandwidth thresh-
olds. This novel model classifies small flows, median flows, and large flows in a
network link. The small flow is a flow whose size is below the low-bandwidth
threshold, the large flow is a flow whose size exceeds the high-bandwidth
threshold, and the result of flows are defined as median flows. Our model
with exactness outside the ambiguity region is able to guarantee that all
large flows are going to be caught anyway and no small flows are going to
be caught by mistake. This model makes sense in large flow detection, be-
cause we can limit the severe damage resulting from large flows and protect
the user experience of legitimate users (i.e. small flows). Although existing
work [2], [3] discussed some similar ideas, only probabilistic bounds outside
This thesis reuses some parts including text and figures from Wu, H. et al. “Eﬃcient
Large Flow Detection over Arbitrary Windows: An Algorithm Exact Outside An Am-
biguity Region”, IMC ’14 Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement
Conference, pp. 209-222 [1], c⃝2014 Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. Reprinted
by permission. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2663716.2663724.
1This is also called as elephant flows in the literature.
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a region are discussed. With the model of ambiguity region between two
bandwidth threshold, we are able to trade the level of exactness for scalabil-
ity, and thus we are able to run the large flow detector in on-chip memory
and achieve link-speed flow check. With this ambiguity-region model and
the arbitrary window model, we are able to improve a lot of applications,
like DoS flow detection, bandwidth guarantees, etc.
As far as we known, there is no algorithm that is able to provide an arbi-
trary window check with exactness outside an ambiguity region. Those prior
approaches which only monitor average network throughput are not able to
detect bursty flows. For instance, by deliberately spreading burst across two
neighbor time intervals, a large bursty flow is able to pass the periodic large
flow detector which resets the state periodically. Moreover, our model is de-
terministic. Although adding randomness into large flow detection (e.g. the
time interval is random) can to some extend solve the problem, such ran-
domized algorithms are not able to provide strong deterministic guarantees
and stable performance.
Therefore, we proposed a novel arbitrary-window-based detector, EARDet
(Exact-outside-Ambiguity-Region Detector), which is exact outside an am-
biguity region. Built on the frequent-item-finding algorithm proposed by
Misra and Gries [4], EARDet is an eﬃcient, simple, and no-per-flow-state
one-pass streaming algorithm that only maintains a small array of counters.
We increase or decrease the counters when a new packet comes into the de-
tector, and once a flow’s counter exceeds the counter threshold, we identify
it as a large flow. It classifies the flows by a high-bandwidth threshold and a
low-bandwidth threshold into large, medium and small flows, and the ambi-
guity region contains flows between these two thresholds (i.e. medium flows).
While keeping no miss detection on large flows, EARDet can project every
small flow from false detection with no assumption on the input traﬃc and
attack pattern.
Moreover, after optimization, we surprisingly found EARDet is extremely
scalable in that it only requires a very small amount of memory while keeping
the strong guarantee over large flow detection. With the requirement of only
such a small size of memory, we can fit it into some on-chip SRAM (Static
Random-Access Memory) and let it process packets with line speed. Of
course, the reason of such eﬃciency is that EARDet only classifies flows
into small flow, median flow, and large flow, but does not estimate the size
2
of the flow.
To evaluate and demonstrate those strong properties of EARDet, in the
rest of this thesis, we are going to not only present detailed theoretical anal-
ysis for EARDet, but also test EARDet with real traﬃc in our simulation
platform.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
2.1 System Model
Flow identifiers In general, the information in the packet header acts as
the flow identifiers (e.g. IP address, port number, etc.) to group packets into
diﬀerent flows. In this thesis, we are focusing on research on a generic large-
flow detection solution which can be applied in cases without assumption on
flow identifiers. Similarly to prior traﬃc monitor work, we assume the flow
identifiers (or flow IDs) are unforgeable, which can be achieved by multiple
existing approaches, e.g. source authentication [5] and ingress filtering [6].
Packet streams In the packet space X , we consider that the large-flow
detector processes a packet stream X = ⟨x1, · · · , xk⟩ coming in sequence
through a link with capacity ρ, where xi ∈ X ∀i = 1 · · · k. Due to the high
capacity of the link and the limit of the memory of the detector, the detector
can only process the packets once (i.e. only making one pass over the packet
stream).
For a packet x, we make the following denotation for later discussion. The
time at which the large-flow detector observes the packet x is denoted as
time(x); the flow ID of the packet x is denoted as fid(x); and the size of
packet x is denoted as size(x). Then we denote the traﬃc volume of a flow
f during time [t1, t2) as vol(f, t1, t2) !
∑
x∈X ,fid(x)=f,t1≤time(x)<t2
size(x).
2.2 Large and Small Flows
The large flow here is the flow which occupies high bandwidth or consumes a
large volume of link bandwidth over some short time window. Therefore, we
defined a threshold function TH(t2 − t1) for the limit of bandwidth. The t2
4
and t1 in the function indicate that the function only depends on the length
of the time window [t2, t1).
For a flow f , if there exists a time window [t1, t2) over which the volume
of flow vol(f, t1, t2) exceeds a threshold function TH(t2− t1), then the flow f
is classified as large flow; otherwise, the flow f is considered as small flow.
Namely, (i) when vol(f, t1, t2) > TH(t2 − t1), f is large flow; conversely, (ii)
when vol(f, t1, t2) ≤ TH(t2 − t1), f is considered as small flow.
Leaky bucket model Ideally, people want to define large flow based
on the leaky bucket model. The leaky bucket model is widely used in the
packet switched computer network for checking the traﬃc of data packets and
defining the bandwidth limits and burstiness. In the leaky bucket model, the
bucket is actually a counter with as fixed rate to decrease its value when the
counter is larger than zero. When new packets of a flow arrive at the bucket,
it increases the value by the volume of the packets and checks whether the
value exceeds the threshold of the leaky bucket. If the threshold is exceeded,
then the flow exceeds the bandwidth limit, i.e. the decreasing rate of the
bucket.
Then, the threshold function based on the form of the leaky bucket de-
scriptor is: TH(t) = γ t + β, where γ > 0, β > 0. The γ and β here are the
decrease rate and threshold of the leaky bucket. However, utilizing the leaky
bucket algorithm to check large flow is impractical. This is because network
links contain numerous flows and usually run at high speed (e.g. the rate of
backbone line is above gigabytes/s), it is very hard to keep the per-flow state
as the leaky bucket model does. Thus, catching the large flow defined by the
leaky bucket model is challenging.
2.3 Time Window Models
The time window [t1, t2) is a range of time over which the large-flow detector
considers the volume of the flow. For example, in some approaches, if the
volume of the large flow in [t1, t2) exceeds some threshold, then, it is judged as
large flow. To identify the large flows defined by the leaky bucket model, the
algorithm has to use the arbitrary window model [3]. However achieving the
arbitrary window model in practice is challenging, therefore, people usually
use some approximate approaches to roughly identify large flows. Thus we
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40 Gbps link congested by
50-Byte packets
Landmark windowmodel
(landmark at 0)
Examine flows in [0, t) ==> flow B evades detection
Sliding windowmodel
(window size = 30ns)
Examine flows in [t-30, t) ==> flow B evades detection
Arbitrary windowmodel Examine flows in [s, t) for all t > s >= 0 ==> flow B is a
large flow over [10, 50) and can be detected
0 10 20 30 40 t=50 (ns)
A B C D B
Figure 2.1: In this example, if a flow’s volume in time window w with any
size is larger than 40 Mbps·w + 500 Kb, then it is a large flow. The flow B
exceeds the threshold over time window w = [10, 50), however, only the
arbitrary time window can catch it [1].
have two more typical time window models: the landmark window model [2,
4, 7–12] and the sliding window model [13–15].
Landmark window model The landmark window model takes the clos-
est landmark in the past as the starting time and the current time as the
ending time for each time windows (e.g. the landmark could be placed in
each 10 seconds). In other words, the landmark window model checks every
time window in {[ti, ti +∆i)|∆i < ti+1 − ti}.
Sliding window model The sliding window model considers the recent
traﬃc as more important than the old traﬃc, thus the time window starts at
some recent time in the past and ends at the current time. Once a new packet
arrives, the sliding window model will exclude the oldest packet and keep the
newest one. We can state the sliding time window as {[t−∆, t)|t ∈ R}.
Arbitrary window model The arbitrary window model is the stronger
time window model to detect the large flows. It monitors each possible time-
scales that starts at every instant in time and ends at the current time.
Namely, for a flow f , the arbitrary window model monitors it over windows
{[t1, t2)|∀ t1, t2 ∈ R, t1 < t2}. Therefore, it is more diﬃcult for large flows to
evade the detection in front of the arbitrary window model, as demonstrated
in Figure 2.1.1
1Figure 2.1 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c⃝2014 Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we review prior works by the techniques they use in the
algorithm as presented in the survey by Cormode and Hadjieleftheriou [16]:
counter-based technique, sketch-based technique, and sampling-based tech-
nique. We pick and summarize some typical algorithms in each category and
discuss their drawbacks.
3.1 Counter-Based Algorithm
There are many counter-based algorithms working to find the frequent item,
which is closely related to our large-flow identification problem. In a stream
with m items, the frequent item is the item that presents more than mn+1
times, where the n is the number of counters. The Misra-Gries (MG) algo-
rithm [4] takes a stream of items as input and find the set of frequent items
exactly. The MG algorithm extends the majority algorithm [17, 18], which
only considers finding the majority vote.
3.2 Sketch-Based Algorithm
The sketch-based algorithm takes a stream as input, applies linear projection
or hashing on the input, and produces a matrix. The matrix usually consists
of a small number of bits.
Fixed-window-based Multistage Filters (FMF) A multistage filter
algorithm is proposed by Estan and Varghese [2] to detect large flows over
the fixed window model1 (called FMF in this paper). The FMF has multiple
1The fixed window model is a special case of the landmark window model with a fixed
measurement interval.
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stages, and each of the stages contains an array with the same number of
counters. When a packet arrives at the multistage filter, its flow identifier is
hashed to one counter in each stage (each stage has a diﬀerent hash function).
For each counter, the value increases by the size of the packet assigned to
it. Once all of the corresponding counters of a flow f violate the pre-defined
threshold, the flow f is judged as large flow.
Arbitrary-window-based Multistage Filters (AMF) One of the ob-
vious drawbacks of FMF is that the fixed window model cannot catch the
bursty flow2 spanning two measurement intervals. To address this, Estan [3]
proposed an improved algorithm of multistage filters based on the arbitrary
window model. The counters in each stage are replaced by leaky buckets
according to the large flow threshold (i.e. TH(t) = γt+β). The same applies
to FMF, a flow is judged as a large flow if its corresponding leaky buckets
are all violated.
3.3 Sampling-Based Algorithm
By sampling the packets in the link, the overhead of algorithm can be reduced
eﬀectively. The Sampled NetFlow [19] is a classic sampling based algorithm
which samples packets with a rate of 1/γ and estimates the frequency of flows
by multiplying the count by γ. To improve the Sampled NetFlow, Estan and
Varghese [2] propose the sample and hold method which examines every
incoming packets: if the flow of the packet is monitored, then increase the
corresponding count; otherwise add the flow of the packet into the monitoring
list with certain probability.
3.4 Drawbacks of Current Algorithms
We mainly discuss the MG algorithm, FMF, AMF, and sample and hold
method. The main drawback among the first three algorithms is that they
cannot avoid false accusation on the small flows (non-frequent items). For
the MG algorithm, it can make sure all the frequent items are stored in
the counter at last, but cannot exclude non-frequent items in the one-pass
2Bursty flow is a kind of large flow which sends very high volume traﬃc in a short time.
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process. The FMF and AMF are the multistage filters algorithms, whose
counter could be shared by both large flows and small flows. With some
probability, the hash function could map a large flow and small flow to exactly
the same counter in each stage. This problem is the nature of multistage
filters and cannot be avoided.
Since the sample and hold algorithm just samples the flows to measure, it
may not check some large flows. Therefore the sample and hold algorithm
has a false detection rate on the large flows. That is, a large flow could evade
detection with some probability.
Since the MG algorithm, sample and hold algorithm, and FMF are based
on the landmark window model, they cannot catch bursty flows as Section
2.3 illustrated.
Although AMF can guarantee a rate of catching all the large flows by its
arbitrary window model, it introduces more false detections on the small flows
than FMF. Because the leaky bucket is more sensitive to being violated, there
are more flows that could exceed the threshold of the leaky bucket model than
the fixed window model.
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CHAPTER 4
PROBLEM DEFINITION
To make progress in large flow detection, we aim to design an eﬃcient
arbitrary-window-based large flow algorithm which is exact outside an am-
biguity window. In this section, we present our novel model and clarify our
goals.
4.1 Exact-Outside-Ambiguity-Region Large-Flow
Problem
Large, medium, and small flows To formulate the large-flow problem
that is exact-outside-ambiguity-region, we re-define the flows as follows. For
a flow f , it is judged as a large flow, if there exists a time window [t1, t2)
over which the volume of f , vol(f, t1, t2) is higher than the high-bandwidth
threshold function THh(t2 − t1); the flow f is judged as a small flow, if flow
f ’s volume vol(f, t1, t2) over all the possible time window [t1, t2) is lower than
a low-bandwidth threshold THℓ(t2 − t1). The rest of flows are considered as
flows in an ambiguity region, which we call medium flows.
Considering the arbitrary window model, we defined the threshold function
based on the leaky bucket model: THh(t) = γht+ βh and THℓ(t) = γℓt+ βℓ,
where γh > γℓ > 0 and βh > βℓ > 0.
Exactness outside an ambiguity region Instead of considering ineﬃ-
cient exact approaches, we propose a relaxed notion of exactness as follows:
Definition 1 Given a packet stream, the large flow problem of exactness
outside an ambiguity region returns a set of flows F such that (1) F contains
every large flow, and (2) F does not contain any small flow.1
1The Definition 1 is derived from Wu et al’s paper [1].
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Figure 4.1: A general framework for a large-flow-detection algorithm. The
detection algorithm processes incoming flows and keeps limited states in
memory. Results may be reported to a remote server for further analysis [1].
According to the definition above, we also define a positive as a flow that is
inserted into F , a negative is a flow that is not inserted into F . Therefore, we
have: (1) False Positive of small flows (FPs) means the detection algorithm
added small flows into F by mistake; and (2) False Negative of large flows
(FNℓ) means the detection algorithm fails to add large flows into F .
This novel exactness model is reasonable, because the damage caused by
large flows is confined by it, and the medium flows can still be handled by ex-
isting approaches (e.g. sample and hold algorithm [2], Sampled Netflow [19],
etc.).
One thing necessary to mention is that the size of flow set F is increasing
indefinitely over time, thus such a large flow detection algorithm usually
periodically reports results to some report servers with a large amount of
storage to maintain a copy of F , as demonstrated in Figure 4.1.2 Therefore
such large flow detection algorithm have to correctly make response without
knowledge from the flow set F .
4.2 Design Goal
Exactness outside an ambiguity region We want to design a deter-
ministic large flow detector which can accurately identify every large flow
2Figure 4.1 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c⃝2014 Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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(including the bursty flow) (i.e. no-FNℓ) and never wrongly judges a small
flow as a large flow (i.e. no-FPs) with any input traﬃc or attack pattern (i.e.
we make no assumption on the input traﬃc).
Scalability In front of a high rate link, the large flow detector should
maintain low per-packet operation and small router state so that the al-
gorithm can be implemented in some fast but scarce storage devices (e.g.
on-chip cache) regardless of the input traﬃc and attack pattern.
Fast detection To minimize the collateral damage, we desire that the
large flow detector can catch the large flow as soon as possible once it violates
the high-bandwidth threshold. Thus, for a large flow which violates the high-
bandwidth threshold over [t1, t2), the detector should be able to detect this
flow before an upper bound time t2 + tprocess, where the tprocess is the time
needed in processing a packet.
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CHAPTER 5
ALGORITHM
According to the design goals described in Section 4.2, we proposesEARDet,
an arbitrary-window-based algorithm, which resolves the large flow problem
with exactness outside an ambiguity window. Inspired by the MG algo-
rithm [4], EARDet takes the no-FNℓ advantage of the MG algorithm and
extends it from the landmark window model to the arbitrary window model.
Moreover, EARDet achieve the no-FPs property with only processing pack-
ets in one pass. Interestingly, despite such amazing properties achieved by
EARDet, it only needs some simple modifications over the original MG
algorithm.
5.1 EARDet Overview
At the high level, EARDet has the following three main diﬀerences com-
pared to the MG algorithm:
Virtual traﬃc Diﬀerent from frequent-item finding, the large-flow prob-
lem works on each time slot in the link. Hence, we should not only consider
the real packets, but also the idle time gap between two consecutive pack-
ets. In EARDet, we virtually fill these idle time gaps with virtual traﬃc.
The virtual flows in the virtual traﬃc are designed as small flows to avoid
unnecessary alarms.
Blacklist We maintain a local blacklist L in EARDet to keep the re-
cently identified large flows. The main reason to use the blacklist is to avoid
increasing a counter of a flow when the counter value has reached a counter
threshold, βTH . Once a counter exceeds βTH , EARDet moves the associated
flow to the blacklist, and the counter will no longer be updated by the flows
in the blacklist. In paper by Wu et al. [1], we have some techniques to bound
the size of the blacklist to avoid spending too many resources on blacklist.
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Counter threshold As described above, each counter has a threshold
βTH to limit the value. The flows exceeding the threshold will be sent to the
blacklist, which enable us to confine the size of each counter by the upper
bound of βTH + α, where the α is the maximum packet size.
5.2 Algorithm Description
We show how EARDet works in Algorithm 1.1 In the algorithm, we treat a
packet (including virtual packets) of w size as w uni-size items, and apply a
mechanism similar to the one in the MG algorithm to increase and decrease
the n counters which are indexed by flow identifiers. There are at most n
non-zero counters (the set of non-zero counters is denoted as C), and each
counter is at most associated with a flow at the same time. We use S in the
algorithm to denote the state of the counters.
To clearly illustrate Algorithm 1, we introduce an example in Figure 5.12
to show details of how EARDet updates its status (i.e. counters). At the
beginning of the example, there is an empty counter, hence when flow g
with a size of 2 arrives, EARDet assigns the empty counter to flow g and
increases it by 2. Then, when flow b comes to EARDet, its size is added
to the counter associated with flow b, so that the value of flow b’s counter
violates the threshold hold βTH and flow b is added into blacklist L. At this
time, flow b will not be considered for increasing or decreasing the counter
anymore. Then, since no empty counters remain, each counter decreases by
the size of flow e’s packet. At last, EARDet treats the virtual traﬃc as two
packets with a size of 3 and reaches the final state.
5.3 Optimization in Data Structure
To make EARDet eﬃcient and scalable, we must do some optimization to
reduce the counter access. A naive implementation of EARDet has to ac-
cess each counter once a packet passes through the system, and access each
counter numerous times for processing virtual packets if we use 1 byte as the
1This algorithm is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1].
2Figure 5.1 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c⃝2014 Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
14
Algorithm 1 EARDet [1]
1: Initialization (S ← Init(n), Line 8-9)
2: for each packet x in the stream do
3: if x’s FID f is not blacklisted (f /∈ L) then
4: Update counters for virtual traﬃc (Line 18-22)
5: Update counters for x (S ← Update(S, x), Line 10-17)
6: if detect violation (Detect(S, x) == 1, Line 21-22) then
7: Add f to blacklist (L← L ∪ {f})
8: Initialization, Init(n)
9: initialize all counters to zeros, L← ∅, C ← ∅
10: Update counters for packet x, Update(S, x)
11: if x’s FID f is kept (f ∈ C) then
12: Update f ’s counter by the packet size w (cf ← cf + w)
13: else if less than n counters are kept (|C| < n) then
14: Set f ’s counter to w (cf ← w, C ← C ∪ {f})
15: else
16: Decrease all counters by d = min{w,minj∈C cj}
17: Set cf to w − d, and ∀j remove j from C if cj = 0
18: Update counters for virtual traﬃc between xi and xi−1
19: Compute the virtual traﬃc size, v (v = ρtidle−size(xi−1), and tidle = time(xi)−
time(xi−1))
20: For each unit u in the virtual traﬃc, update counters as if u belongs to a new
flow (e.g., unit is 1 byte)
21: Detect violation, Detect(S, x)
22: Return whether x’s flow counter exceeds threshold (cf > βTH)
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Figure 5.1: Example of updating EARDet status. βTH = 10, α = 3, and
n = 3 [1].
virtual packet size. We are not able to aﬀord such computation consump-
tion in high-speed links, e.g. backbone links. Therefore, we optimize our
algorithm as follows.
Balanced binary search tree To save computation consumption in
EARDet, the first thing we need to do is to have a proper data structure
which can support insertion, deletion, and retrieving the minimum counter
among all counters. A balanced binary search tree is a good choice in this
case, because it can achieve these operations in O(log n) time.
Float ground for decrement operation To avoid retrieving and de-
creasing all counters when one packet arrives, we consider the counter value
relative to floating ground cground instead of recording the absolute counter
values. In this way, once a packet comes in, we do not have to decrease
each counters, but just need to elevate the floating ground. Finally, to judge
whether the counter exceeds the threshold, we only need to check whether
cf − cground > βBF is true. To prevent overflow in counters, we periodically
reset the floating ground to zero and accordingly reduce the value of each
counter.
Eﬃciently process virtual flows As mentioned, if we set the packet
size too small for flow virtual flows, we are going to update the counters too
many times. We noticed that we actually expect to divide virtual traﬃc to
multiple virtual flows to make virtual flows comply with the low-bandwidth
threshold (i.e. we will not mistake virtual flows as large flows), meanwhile
we want to minimize the packet processing cost for virtual flows.
Thus, the maximum packets size is the counter threshold βTH bytes. Be-
cause the counter threshold βTH has to be larger than minimum packet size
(i.e. 40 bytes), the overhead is bounded by that of the worst case when the
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link is congested by minimum-size packets.
Implement counters with integers To make the system more eﬃcient,
we use integers to implement counters rather than using float numbers. In
this way, we not only save storage space but also modify counters faster.
However, we should be careful here, because the size of virtual traﬃc is not
always an integer. For example, for a link with 800 Mbps capacity and an
idle interval 1 ns, we have 0.1 byte virtual traﬃc. To handle this issue,
we have a little change in our thresholds: EARDet can catch all large
flows violating THh(t) = γht + (βh + 1) and no false positive for small flows
complying THℓ(t) = γℓt + (βh − 1). We derive the proof sketch from Wu et
al.’s paper [1]:
Proof sketch We bound such biases with a slightly modified algorithm
that adjusts virtual traﬃc. Let us use {v1, v2, · · · } to denote the sizes of
a sequence of virtual traﬃc and {v′1, v
′
2, · · · } to denote the adjusted sizes.
We maintain an extra field called “carryover”, co, which keeps the amount
of uncounted virtual traﬃc. The co is initialized to zero, and we ensure
that −0.5 ≤ co < 0.5 all the time. Virtual flows are adjusted such that
v′i ← [vi + coi] and coi+1 ← coi + vi − v
′
i where coi is the value of co before
proceeding vi. By construction, v′is are all integers, and for any a, b, |
∑b
a vi−∑b
a v
′
i| = |cob+1− coa| ≤ 1. In other words, the adjusted virtual traﬃc diﬀers
from the original one by at most 1 unit for any time interval. Consequently,
the modified algorithm guarantees catching flows that violate THh(t) = γht+
(βh + 1) and guarantees not catching any flow that conforms to THℓ(t) =
γℓt+ (βh − 1). [1] "
Run EARDet in parallel A straightforward way to scale a large flow
detection algorithm is to parallelize it with multiple detectors. We could
randomly distribute the input flows into k EARDet, and each EARDet
detector only has approximately 1/k of overhead. However, this approach
also has some drawbacks: (1) it may not be able to evenly distribute over-
head, because 1/k flows does not mean 1/k packets; and (2) randomness
weakens the deterministic property, so attackers could manipulate the flows
based on the random seed to escape detection.
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CHAPTER 6
ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we analyzed the unique properties in EARDet, and the-
oretically proved them. Moreover, we analyzed the trade-oﬀ in the tuning
parameters of EARDet. Please refer to the List of Symbols to understand
the notation used in the analysis.
In the analysis, we consider an n-counter EARDet is running over a
network link and its link capacity is ρ. We use βTH to denote the threshold
of the counter, and use α as the maximum packet size. Thus, βTH +α is the
maximum possible value of each counter.
6.1 Property 1: No False Negative on Large Flows
To analyze the false negative issue of this filter, we consider the performance
of our filter under the worst case (namely, the best case for the attacker).
To have the worst case for us, the attackers expect their counter’s value can
decrease as much as possible to make the attacker’s flow have the smallest
possibility to be caught by the filter.
To consider the decrement of the counters, firstly, we describe all the ways
to decrease and increase the value counters:
1. When the incoming flows are virtual flows and there are l empty coun-
ters in the filter, then, in time interval t, the decrement is ρl+1t on all
counters, and the increment is 0 (l = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., n).
2. When the incoming flows are new real flows and there is no empty
counter in the filter, then, in time interval t the decrement is ρt on all
counters and the increment is 0. (This is the same as the first situation
when l = 0.) The new real flows means there is no associated counter
in the filter for this flow.
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3. When the incoming flows are old real flows, or new real flows and there
are some empty counters, then, in time interval t, the decrement is 0
and the increment is ρ t on one counter. The old real flow means there
is an associated counter in the filter for this flow.
Thus, in the first and second situations, when there are l empty counters
in the filter, the decrement is always ρl+1t in the interval of t; and in the third
situation, the increment is always ρ t in the interval of t. The increment and
decrement cannot happen at the same time.
We proved Lemma 2 as follow, and the proof sketch of it is in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 2 In any time interval [t1, t2], the upper bound of decrement of all
the counters is ρn+1 · (t2 − t1) + α + βTH .
1
With Lemma 2, we proved that EARDet can detect any large flows which
violate the high-bandwidth threshold. We theoretically proved this property
and conclude it in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 No-FNℓ property EARDet detects every flow violating
the high-bandwidth threshold THh(t) = γht+βh over a time window of length
t, when γh ≥ RNFN =
ρ
n+1 and βh ≥ α + 2βTH .
2
Proof sketch According to Lemma 2, in time interval [t1, t2], the decre-
ment of a counter will not exceed ρn+1 · (t2 − t1) + α + βTH . And because
any flow cannot be associated with two or more counters at the same time,
therefore, in any [t1, t2], for any flow f passing the filter the decrement
decf <
ρ
n+1 · (t2 − t1) + α + βTH . Thus, if there is a flow f with rate of
R(t), and it violates the high-bandwidth threshold, then:
∫ t2
t1
R(t) dt ≥ THh(t2 − t1) ≥
ρ
n+ 1
(t2 − t1) + α + 2βTH (6.1)
Then, the remaining value of f ’s counter is:
Remains =
∫ t2
t1
R(t) dt− decf > βTH (6.2)
1Lemma 2 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
2Theorem 3 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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Because βTH is the threshold of the filter, the flow f will be caught before
time t2. Therefore, for any flow which violates the high-bandwidth threshold,
it will be caught by the filter. Namely, there is no false negative in the filter
on detecting the flows violating the high-bandwidth threshold. Thus, this
theorem is proved now. "
Another way to prove Theorem 3 is presented in Wu et al.’s paper [1].
From Theorem 3, EARDet can be applied to enforce that all flows vi-
olating the high-bandwidth threshold, THh(t) = γht + βh, where γh =
ρ
n+1
and βh = α + 2βTH , will be caught by the filter and cut oﬀ. In this way, we
can largely protect a network link from the large flow attack and the burst
attack, especially when the number of attackers (or attack flows) is fewer
than n. That means, if the attackers want to attack this link successfully,
they should have more than n machines to send floods. Therefore, this filter
eﬀectively limits the DoS attacks.
6.2 Property 2: No False Positive on Small Flows
EARDet will not wrongly catch any small flow complying the low-bandwidth
threshold. To demonstrate this point, we first proposed Lemma 4 [1] as fol-
lows. The proof of this lemma is in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 4 For any small flow f that complies with the low-bandwidth thresh-
old (i.e., THℓ(t) = γℓ t+βℓ), once the flow f is associated to a counter at t1,
this counter will always be lower than βTH after time t1 + tβℓ, if the counter
is occupied by the same flow as the flow f , where tβℓ =
(n−1)α+(n+1)βℓ
[1−(n+1)γℓ/ρ]ρ
.3
Then, we proposed Theorem 5 [1] which illustrates the property of no false
positives on small flows.
Theorem 5 No-FPs property EARDet will not catch any flow com-
plying with the low-bandwidth threshold THℓ(t) = γℓt+βℓ for all time windows
of length t, when 0 < βℓ < βTH , γℓ < RNFP , where RNFP =
β∆
(n−1)α+(n+1)βℓ+(n+1)β∆
·
ρ.4
3Lemma 4 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
4Theorem 5 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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Proof sketch According to Lemma 4, to avoid catching a small flow f ,
the counter should be smaller than βTH before tβℓ . Hence, we choose a γℓ to
achieve γℓ tβℓ + βℓ < βTH . Then,
(n−1)α+(n+1)βℓ
[1−(n+1)γℓ/ρ]ρ
< βTH−βℓγℓ ,
⇔ γℓ <
β∆
(n− 1)α+ (n+ 1)βℓ + (n+ 1)β∆
· ρ (6.3)
The theorem is proved. "
6.3 Property 3: Large Flow Incubation Period
Considering a large flow f violates a high-bandwidth threshold over time
window [t1, t2), we assume the detection is triggered by the packet at ta.
Then, we define the incubation period as ta − t1, where ta ≤ t2 is due to the
no-FNℓ property of EARDet. According to theoretical analysis, we proved
there is an upper bound of the incubation period for the large flow. The
upper bound depends on the rate of the large flow over [t1, t2).
Theorem 6 For the flow f which violates THh(t) over some time window
[t1, t2), if its average rate R(t1, ta) is larger than Ratk in the time interval of
[t1, ta) (Ratk is a constant rate larger than RNFN =
ρ
n+1), then f ’s incubation
period is bounded by tincb <
α+2βTH
Ratk−
ρ
n+1
.5
Proof sketch6 Because R(t1, ta) > Ratk, intuitively the tincb of flow with
an average rate of R(t1, ta) must be shorter than the t′incb of flow with a rate
of Ratk. That is, tincb < t′incb.
Assume a flow f ′ with rate Ratk will violate THh(t) over time window
[t′1, t
′
2), then
Ratk(t
′
2 − t
′
1) =
ρ
n+ 1
(t′2 − t
′
1) + α+ 2βTH
⇒ tincb < t
′
incb = t
′
a − t
′
1 ≤ t
′
2 − t
′
1 =
α+ 2βTH
Ratk −
ρ
n+1
(6.4)
Thus, the theorem is proved. "
5Theorem 6 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
6The proof sketch is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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6.4 Property 4: Deterministic Performance
The proofs of the three properties above do not make any assumptions on the
input traﬃc, which means EARDet will keep these properties regardless of
the type of the input traﬃc or attack pattern. The attackers are not able to
escape the detection through manipulating the flows and playing with timing.
Thus, we say EARDet provides deterministic performance over large flow
detection.
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CHAPTER 7
EVALUATION
In this chapter, we present the theoretical analysis and real-traﬃc simulation
results of EARDet and another two related large flow detection algorithms,
Fixed-window-based Multistage Filters (FMF) [2] and Arbitrary-window-
based Multistage Filters (AMF) [3], to evaluate performance of EARDet.
In terms of the exactness outside the ambiguity region, the evaluation shows
that EARDet outperforms the prior work in both large rate flow detection
and burst flow detection.
7.1 Theoretical Evaluation
As introduced in Section 3.2, multistage filter maintains an array of counters
to record the size of flows. For an incoming flow, the filter will hash map the
flow identifier to a counter in the array, and whenever a packet of this flow
arrives in the filter, we increase the counter by the size of the packet. Once
the value of the counter exceeds the threshold of a large flow, multistage filter
catches all flows associated to this counter as a large flow. The diﬀerence
between AMF and FMF is that AMF uses leaky buckets instead of regular
counters.
We can easily observe that FMF and AMF have no false negative over
large flows, because if a flow is a large flow, its counter must exceed the large
flow threshold. However, there are some false positives resulting from these
two algorithms. For example, if a large flow and a small flow are mapped to
the same counter, the small flow will be detected as a large flow too. To lower
the false positive rate, FMF and AMF must increase the number of counters.
But this introduces more overhead in storage space. To understand the
performance of three large flow detector algorithms, we present a concrete
example here. Considering the case with γh = 1%ρ, γl = 0.1%ρ, where ρ
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is the link capacity. The performance of three detectors are described in
Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Numerical Example for FMF, AMF, and EARDet.
Detector Number of Counters (n) Rate of FPs Rate of FNℓ
EARDet 101 0 0
FMF 101 no guarantee 0∗
FMF 1000 ≤ 0.04∗ 0∗
AMF 101 no guarantee 0
AMF 2000 ≤ 0.04 0
∗The result for FMF is not applicable for large burst flows. Because FMF is
based on the landmark window model, it provides no guarantee for
detecting large burst flows.
Table 7.1 shows that with the same amount of memory space thatEARDet
uses (i.e. 101 counters), FMF and AMF cannot guarantee there will be no
false positives for small flows at all; on the contrary, EARDet can guar-
antee both no false positives for small flows and no false negatives for large
flows. Even using 10x (20x) memory, FMF (AMF) can only guarantee a 0.04
false positive rate for small flows. Moreover, as we mentioned, FMF has no
guarantee for large burst flows, however, EARDet and AMF are able to
guarantee this. To make the result clearer, we summarize the comparison
result in Table 7.2. We say FMF and AMF are not deterministic, because
they are dependent on input traﬃc that can be manipulated by an attacker
to result in false positives.
Table 7.2: Comparison Summary for FMF, AMF, and EARDet.
Detector Storage Cost No-FPs No-FNℓ Deterministic
EARDet low guarantee no guarantee yes
FMF high no guarantee no guarantee no
AMF high no guarantee guarantee no
7.2 Experimental Evaluation Environment
Traﬃc datasets To make the experiment more convincing, we use real
network traﬃc datasets Federico II [20–22] and CAIDA [23], and we use the
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first 30 seconds of traﬃc to run FMF, AMF, and EARDet. Under the flow
ID defined by the pair of source IP and destination IP, we summarize each
dataset as follows:
• Federico II dataset contains 2911 flows which are collected from a 200
Mbps link. The average link rate is 1.85 MB/s and the average flow
size is around 19.9 KB.
• CAIDA dataset contains around 2.5 million flows from a 10 Gbps link.
The average link rate is about 280 MB/s and the average flow size is
about 3.3 KB.
Attack flows To comprehensively evaluate performance of EARDet
compared to FMF and AMF, we artificially generated two kinds of attack
flows: flooding attack flows and shrew DoS attack flows [24,25], and mix the
generated attack flows with the real traﬃc as the experiment input traﬃc.
Then we test (1) how many attack flows escape the detection, and (2) how
many legitimate flows are falsely caught as large flows.
Flooding attack flows are the flows with a high rate, thus we generate such
flows second by second. For each second interval, we randomly distribute
γlarge/packetSize packets in this one second, where γlarge is the flooding flow
rate. Then we do the same work for all 30 seconds.
Shrew DoS attack flows consist of some periodic bursts, and attackers use
such bursty traﬃc to block TCP traﬃc by exploiting the TCP congestion
control mechanism. To generate shrew DoS attack flows, we randomly pick
up an initial timestamp (from 0 to 29 seconds) for each flow, and then gener-
ate a burst with size γburst · lburst every T seconds, where γburst is the rate of
the burst traﬃc, the lburst is the duration of each burst, and T is the period
of the burst.
Configure EARDet We configure EARDet’s parameters as shown in
Table 7.3. With this configuration, EARDet is able to catch all large flows
which violates the high-bandwidth threshold THh(t) = 0.01ρt + 15.5 KB,
while not hurting any legitimate flows which comply with the low-bandwidth
threshold THℓ(t) = 0.001ρt+6072 B for flows in dataset Federico II. For the
dataset CAIDA, there is only a slight diﬀerence in βh, n, and tupincb. The
congested link status means the link is fully congested by flows; the non-
congested link status means the link still contains many idle time intervals.
25
For a detailed description about how to come up such parameters, please
refer the technical report by Wu et al. [26].
Table 7.3: Parameters of EARDet.
Parameters Federico II CAIDA
ρ 25MB/s 1.25GB/s
γh 250KB/s 12.5MB/s
βh 15.5KB 15.4KB
γℓ 25KB/s 1.25MB/s
βℓ 6072B 6072B
α 1518B 1518B
βTH 6991B 6991B
n 107 100
tupincb 0.8370sec 0.1242sec
link status non-congested/congested non-congested
Table 7.4: Parameters of FMF.
Parameters Federico II CAIDA
b 55/250 55/250
d 2 2
n 110/500 110/500
T 250 KB 12.5 MB
Table 7.5: Parameters of AMF.
Parameters Federico II CAIDA
b 55/250 55/250
d 2 2
n 110/500 110/500
u 15.5 KB 15.4 KB
r 250 KB/s 12.5 MB/s
Configure FMF and AMF We set the number of stages for FMF and
AMF as d = 2, and the number of counters in each stage as b = 250.
For FMF, we set the window size as 1 second, namely, it checks whether
the counter exceeds the threshold every second. Therefore, the threshold of
FMF is T = γh. For AMF, we set the leaky bucket threshold as u = βh and
the leaky bucket rate as r = γh. We are also interested in investigating how
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these two large flow detectors perform with the same amount of storage cost
used by EARDet, thus, we also consider the case that b = 55 and d = 2.
The configuration is summarized in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5.
7.3 Experimental Evaluation Results
We found that the experiment result of the experiments using CAIDA dataset
shows a similar result to the one of the experiments using Federico II, thus, we
just present the result of the experiments running with Federico II dataset.
To measure the performance of FMF, AMF, and EARDet, we mainly fo-
cus on three metrics: false positive probability for small flows, and detection
probability and incubation period for large flows. The false positive proba-
bility measures the probability for the detector to wrongly detect a small flow
as a large flow. The detection probability is the probability that a detector
can successfully catch large flows. The large flow incubation period shows
the time needed to catch a large flow since the flow appears in the link.
To illustrate the experiment result, Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3(a)
to 7.3(h), and Figure 7.4 are taken from paper written by Wu et al. [1] c⃝2014
Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
Figure 7.1 shows the detection probability of three detectors in front of
flooding DoS attack. We can see all of three flows can perfectly catch all
large flows which violate the large flow threshold. However, FMF and AMF
cannot guarantee that there are no false positives all the time. Especially,
when the link is congested, FMF and AMF falsely caught a lot of flows below
the low-bandwidth threshold.
Figure 7.2 represents the detection probability of three detectors when
shrew DoS attack happens. As we expected, EARDet and AMF can catch
all bursty attack flows, however, FMF missed a lot of such attack flows
because it is only based on the fixed window model.
For false positive probability over small flows, we take a look at Fig-
ures 7.3(a) to 7.3(h). The result shows no false positives in the result
from EARDet. However FMF and AMF cannot avoid the false positives.
When FMF and AMF are using the same number of counters as used by
EARDet, we can find many false positives, especially in the congested link.
Figure 7.3(a) and Figure 7.3(b) indicate that in the congested link, FMF
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suﬀers more 1% and 4% false positives under shrew DoS attack and flooding
DoS attack respectively. Increasing the number of counters can reduce the
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false positives for FMF and AMF, but it is impossible to guarantee no false
positive.
The results also reflect that EARDet is deterministic regardless of what
input traﬃc is used. It is even more interesting that in the ambiguity region,
the curves of detection probability of EARDet are exactly the same. Maybe
we could discover more in the ambiguity region in the future.
Figure 7.4 perfectly supports Theorem 6. The figure shows that the maxi-
mum incubation period of attack flows is always below the theoretical upper
bound no matter what the attack flow rate is. Moreover, we observed that
usually the maximum incubation period is much smaller than the theoretical
upper bound and the average incubation period is even much smaller.
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Figure 7.3: False positive for small flows [1].
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This thesis reviews some basic knowledge and typical existing approaches
in the large flow detection problem, and identifies the shortcomings of cur-
rent work. Then, we proposed a novel arbitrary-window-based algorithm,
EARDet, which is exact outside an ambiguity window. Inspired by the
MG algorithm, EARDet not only keeps the property of no false detection
over large flows exceeding a high-bandwidth threshold, but also achieves the
no false accusation on small flows complying a low-bandwidth threshold with
no assumption on the input traﬃc or attack pattern. We demonstrate this
both in theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation.
There is some future work for EARDet. (1) EARDet is quite simple and
easy to apply in industry, therefore, we want to build a real system with the
EARDet algorithm and test it in the real network to see the performance
in practice. (2) In the experiment, EARDet’s detection probability curves
under diﬀerent input traﬃc (congested and non-congested traﬃc) are highly
matched, even in the ambiguity region. Thus, it should be interesting to
research the performance in the ambiguity region in future research.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF SKETCH FOR LEMMAS
Note that Appendices A.1 and A.4 are presented in the technical report by
Wu et, al. [26].
A.1 Lemma 7 and Proof Sketch
Lemma 7 In any time interval [t1, t2], we assume there are k attack flows
occupy k counters from the beginning time t1 to the ending time t2. If all
the normal counters (counters except the ones occupied by attack flows) are
empty at beginning time t1 and ending time t2, then, the decrement of all the
counters is (t2−t1)−tlrgn+1−k ρ, where tlrg is the sum of time that k attack flows are
sending packets.
Proof sketch In [t1, t2], because the attack flows occupied the link for tlrg,
the time length of t2 − t1 − tlrg is occupied by some real flows F or virtual
flows (there is no assumption for the flows in F , but such flows should fulfill
that normal counters are empty at beginning time t1 and ending time t2). In
the time of t2 − t1 − tlrg, sometimes the counters are increased by flows in
F , and sometimes the counters are decreased by flows in F or virtual flows.
Therefore, we can assume that the sum of all the decrement dec consists of
many small decrements deci, which happen in time interval ti,dec, and the
number of counters occupied by flows in F is xi during ti,dec. Because the
normal counters are empty at the beginning and the ending, when there is a
decrement deci for each counter, then there must be xi increment inci that
happened on xi non-empty normal counters. Therefore all the decrements
deci in these normal counters have a counterpart of xi increment inci, which
takes ti,inc time length. Maybe deci and xi values of inci are not neighbors in
time domain, but for a decrement deci there must be xi values of inci, such
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that
inci = deci (A.1)
In ti,dec, according to the three ways of decreasing and increasing the counter,
when the number of empty counters is l = n− k − xi, the deci and inci are
as follows
deci =
ρ
n+ 1− k − xi
· ti,dec (A.2)
inci = ρ · ti,inc (A.3)
Then, according to (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3)
⇒
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ti,dec =
(n+ 1− k − xi) · deci
ρ
ti,inc =
inci
ρ
=
deci
ρ
(A.4)
At any time point in t2− t1− tlrg, counters either increase or decrease, thus
t2 − t1 − tlrg =
∑
i
(xi · ti,inc + ti,dec) (A.5)
Then, according to (A.4) and (A.5), we can get
t2 − t1 − tlrg =
∑
i
(xi ·
deci
ρ
+
(n+ 1− k − xi) · deci
ρ
) (A.6)
=
∑
i
(n+ 1− k) · deci
ρ
(A.7)
=
dec(n+ 1− k)
ρ
(A.8)
Then,
⇒ dec =
(t2 − t1)− tlrg
n+ 1− k
ρ (A.9)
Therefore, during [t1, t2] the decrement of all the counters is
(t2−t1)−tlrg
n+1−k ρ, and
this lemma is proved. "
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A.2 Lemma 8 and Proof Sketch
Lemma 8 In any time interval [t1, t2], if all the counters are empty at the
beginning time t1 and the ending time t2, then, the decrement of all the
counters is ρn+1 · (t2 − t1).
Proof sketch Considering the scenario of Lemma 7 , when all the coun-
ters are normal counters (namely k = 0), there is no assumption on all the
incoming flows except the condition that all the counters are empty at the
beginning time t1 and the ending time t2. This scenario is exactly the same
to what is described in Lemma 8. Therefore, to prove Lemma 8, we just need
to consider the scenario of k = 0 in Lemma 7. According to Lemma 7, when
k = 0, the tlrg must be 0, and therefore the decrement is
dec =
(t2 − t1)− tlrg
n+ 1− k
ρ =
(t2 − t1)
n+ 1
ρ (A.10)
Thus, the decrement of the scenario described in Lemma 8 is ρn+1 · (t2 − t1),
and this lemma is proved. "
A.3 Proof Sketch of Lemma 2
Proof sketch To get the upper bound of decrement of all the counters,
we just need consider the maximum decrement for a counter in time interval
[t1, t2]. According to Lemma 8, we can know the decrement of each counter
is ρn+1 · (t2 − t1) when all the counters are empty at the beginning time
t1 and the ending time t2. However, intuitively, the greater the values of
counters are at the beginning, the greater the decrement is, because each
counter saves some time to increase these counters and they have more time
to decrease; also, the less the values of counters are at the ending, the more
the total decrement of all counters is, because if there are remaining values
in the counters, the counters must waste some time to increase the counters
instead of decrease them. Because the maximum value of a counter is α+βTH
and the minimum value of a counter is 0, the scenario of maximum decrement
is: (1) all the counters’ value are α+βTH at the beginning time t1 and (2) all
the counters are empty at the ending time t2. Denote the scenario described
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in Lemma 8 and Lemma 2 as CASE1 and CASE2. The diﬀerence between
CASE1 and CASE2 is that counters in CASE2 have a value of α+βTH at the
beginning, therefore there is an extra decrement of α + βTH in CASE2. To
have the extra decrement in CASE2, counters need to take some extra ti,dec
to decrease the extra decrement, and then the decrement of CASE2 except
the extra decrement α + βTH is lower than the
ρ
n+1 · (t2 − t1), which is the
decrement of CASE1. Therefore, the total decrement of CASE2 is lower than
ρ
n+1 · (t2 − t1) + α + βTH , namely:
dec <
ρ
n+ 1
· (t2 − t1) + α + βTH (A.11)
Therefore, this lemma is proved. "
A.4 Proof Sketch of Lemma 4
Proof sketch WLOG, we assume flow f is associated with a counter at
t1 = 0, and in [0, tocp], flow f always occupies this counter. Then, intuitively,
in [0, tocp], the case to have minimum decrement decmin on this counter is
that: (1) at time 0 all the counters are empty; and (2) at time tocp, except
the counter of flow f , all other counters have the maximum value α + βTH .
Because the remaining values in the counter will cost extra time tinc for
increasing these counters, then according to Lemma 7, the t2−t1 in Lemma 7
is smaller and the decrement is smaller. Therefore, in the case mentioned
above, the decrement is minimized. According to Lemma 7, in this case
t2 − t1 = tocp − tinc, k = 1, then the minimum decrement is:
decmin =
tocp − tinc − tlrg
n
ρ (A.12)
where tinc =
(n−1)(βTH+α)
ρ .
Since f complies with THℓ(t), tlrg < γℓ/ρ · tocp +
βℓ
ρ .
⇒ decmin >
tocp(1− γℓ/ρ)
n
ρ−
(βTH + α)(n− 1) + βℓ
n
(A.13)
⇔ decmin > γℓ tocp +
tocp(1− (n+ 1)
γℓ
ρ )
n
ρ−
(βTH + α)(n− 1) + βℓ
n
(A.14)
When tocp > tβℓ =
(n−1)α+(n+1)βℓ
[1−(n+1)γℓ/ρ]ρ
,
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⇒ decmin > γℓ tocp +
(n− 1)α+ (n+ 1)βℓ
n
ρ−
(βTH + α)(n− 1) + βℓ
n
(A.15)
⇒ γℓ tocp + βℓ − decmin < βTH (A.16)
Because flow f complies with THℓ(t), its counter value is smaller than
tocp + βℓ − decmin. Therefore, the counter is smaller than βTH after tβℓ . "
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